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Parliamentary parties in the British House of Commons tend to experience high levels of 
voting unity with individual MPs only occasionally dissenting from party policy. Although 
constituency influence has been used extensively to predict legislative behaviour in 
candidate-centred electoral environments, it is argued here that constituency preferences can, 
under certain circumstances, shape parliamentary behaviour in a strong-party, weak 
personal-vote, electoral environment such as the United Kingdom. To empirically test this 
argument, the interest representation of British Muslims in the British House of 
Commons and specifically the voting record of MPs on proposed domestic anti-terrorism 
legislation seen to target British Muslims is investigated. The data shows that Labour 
MPs with certain constituency characteristics (relatively large Muslim, ethnic minority and 
migrant populations) were more likely to vote against the leadership position on anti-
terrorism proposals perceived to target certain minorities.  
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 1 
Introduction 
Parliamentary parties in the British House of Commons tend to experience high levels 
of voting unity, with individual MPs seldom, if ever, dissenting from party policy. The 
party centred nature of voting in the chamber mirrors the party-centred nature of 
British elections (Cox 1987). In contrast to other legislative settings, research into 
British MPs’ voting behaviour has generally downplayed the possibility of a link 
between how MPs vote and the preferences of voters in their constituencies. Because 
of the party-centred nature of the electoral system, the assumption is that British MPs 
are unresponsive to constituents’ preferences, leading scholars to discount constituency 
influences as an explanation for legislative behaviour. The perspective is in keeping 
with the comparative literature on legislative voting behaviour which suggests that 
personal-vote electoral systems induce party disunity in the legislative arena while party-
centred electoral rules induce unified party voting (see, for example, Carey 2007; 
Depauw and Martin 2009).  
 Rejecting the universalism of this claim, this study argues an alternative view 
which suggests that party centred electoral environments, can, under certain 
circumstances, be associated with dissent and party disunity within the parliamentary 
arena. It is argued that the preferences of local voters may cause legislators to vote 
against their parties in a legislative division, even in the absence of clear incentives to 
cultivate personal votes.1 To empirically test this argument, the interest representation 
of British Muslims in the British House of Commons and specifically the voting record 
of MPs on proposed domestic anti-terrorism legislation seen to target British Muslims 
is explored. The evidence suggests a link between constituency characteristics and MPs’ 
voting behaviour.  
The next section reviews the existing research that seeks to explain cases of 
legislative voting disunity in the British House of Commons. A detailed explanation of 
why and under what circumstances constituency characteristics should help predict 
patterns of parliamentary voting in a strong-party environment is then presented. Votes 
on the 2005 Terrorism Bill supply the data to test the congruence theory of MP 
behaviour. The concluding section considers the broader consequences of this research 
for our understanding of parliamentary behaviour and minority-group representation in 
British politics. 
 
Conventional Views on Voting Unity 
A number of distinctive approaches to explaining cases of parliamentary party disunity 
can be seen in the existing literature on the British House of Commons. From one 
perspective, parliamentary party voting unity is explained on the basis of the ideological 
cohesiveness within each parliamentary party. Put simply, members of the same party 
vote the same way because they think the same way. Evidence of such ideological 
cohesion comes in particular from free-votes, where, despite the lack of pressure to 
vote strictly along party lines, most MPs nevertheless do (see, for example, Cowley 
1998, Baughman 2004). The implication of this approach for understanding dissent is 
clear: Where an MP disagrees ideologically with the stance of the party leadership, that 
                                                 
1 Throughout this paper the words “constituency” refers to the geographical 
constituency which an MP represents. British MPs are elected by the single member 
plurality ballot structure. 
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MP will dissent (Cowley and Norton 1999). Cowley (2002) finds a relationship between 
ideology and patterns of dissent, with left-leaning Labour MPs more likely to revolt. 
Yet, while confirming an important role for preferences in shaping MPs’ 
voting behaviour, Kam (2001: 115) noted that “An MP’s party affiliation provides 
vastly more information about his or her behaviour than do his or her preferences.” 
Such a perspective highlights the role of party in shaping voting behaviour (Garner and 
Letki 2005). Cowley (2005), while also acknowledging the obvious propensity of like-
minded MPs to vote with each other, notes the importance of the legislative party 
leadership’s role to “persuade, compromise, induce and sanction.” Piper (1991) pointed 
to the importance of party loyalty for promotion. Building on this perspective, 
Benedetto and Hix (2007) showed that MPs who stand little chance of future 
promotion are more likely to vote against the party leadership. More generally, Kam 
(2001) sees breaches in party voting unity as resulting from breakdowns in party 
leadership.  
In British politics, typically the local party organization plays an important role 
in selecting and re-selecting a candidate. The power to deselect is likely to strongly 
influence the behaviour of parliamentarians (Strøm 1997). Observing the local party 
punishment of anti-Suez Conservatives MPs, Epstein (1960) was among the first to 
show that the preferences of the constituency-level party organisation could influence 
an MP to dissent from the national party leadership (Epstein: 384). Rasmussen (1966) 
found a similar constituency party-MP link for the Profumo affair.  Later, however, 
Schwarz and Lambert (1971) questioned the influence of local party organisations in 
motivating dissent or loyalty, finding only a weak relationship between the threat of de-
selection by the local party and loyalty to the party among Conservative MPs. Likewise, 
Norton (see, for example, Norton 1978, 1980) has questioned the extent to which MPs 
who dissent do so to please local party organizations. Norton (2003) noted that some 
Labour MPs successfully confronted pressure from their local party for not dissenting 
from support of the Labour Government’s Iraq policy.  
For the sake of clarity, a careful differentiation between the constituency-level 
party and the constituency electorate is necessary. In British politics the slectorate (local 
party) and electorate differ greatly in composition and size, with only a small 
proportion of the electorate forming the slectorate. Clearly indeed, the preferences of 
the two groups may be very different. In addition to being more actively engaged in 
partisan affairs, the median selectorate is likely to have more extreme views than the 
median voter (Whiteley and Seyd 2002). Hence, the need to differentiate between 
constituency party and constituency (voter). Thus, much of the research branded as 
exploring constituency influence on MP behaviour is more appropriately branded an 
exploration of constituency-party influence. But what precisely is the known influence 
of constituency voters on MPs’ voting behaviour? 
The role of constituents in shaping the voting behaviour of British MPs has 
been most researched with regard to free-votes. While the evidence is not always 
strong, the consensus is that a link exists between constituents and MPs. Notably of 
course, by definition, free votes cannot engender dissent, as MPs are free to vote as 
they choose. Looking at a selection of votes on social issues, Hibbing and Marsh (1987: 
291) concluded that “The more Roman Catholics there are in a constituency, the more 
likely the person representing that constituency is to vote in a socially conservative 
fashion.” Considering un-whipped votes on abortion, by linking the religiosity of a 
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constituency to MPs’ voting records on abortion during the 1990s, Baughman (2004) 
found evidence that members voted in accord with the preferences of their 
constituents.2 Thus, while an analysis of free votes provides some evidence of 
constituency effect, the obvious selection bias in dealing with unmanaged votes 
prevents weighing the competing pressures of national party and constituency interests. 
The literature on constituency effect in the presence of managed votes is 
relatively sparse and not entirely conclusive. In her work on the repeal of Corn Laws in 
the mid 1840s, Schonhardt-Bailey (1994) found that MPs from (pro-protectionist) 
agricultural constituencies were more likely to vote to maintain protection, and in the 
overall assessment, constituency interests took precedence over MPs’ personal 
ideologies. Arguing that MPs face potentially competing pressures from three different 
sources (national party, local party and constituents), Gaines and Garrett (1993) found 
evidence that government backbench rebellions in the mid- to late 1970s could be at 
least partly explained by constituency characteristics (in particular the economic and 
social constituency characteristics such as percentage of council housing dwellers and 
the occupational backgrounds of voters). Exploring revolts between 1992-1997, 
Depauw (2003) discounts the impact of constituency interests, discovering in his data 
analysis that constituency-level variables such as population density, owner-occupier 
rates, public housing rates, proportion of non-nationals, occupations, and 
unemployment rates are not easily related to an MP’s decision to dissent. Thus, while 
some evidence exists for constituency effect in the British parliamentary case, the 
research is rather limited and not always conclusive. The next section explores the 
theoretical basis for such a constituency effect, even in the presence of strong parties 
and little incentive to cultivate personal votes.  
 
Congruence and Strong Parties 
In a representative system of government, voters delegate decision-making tasks to 
elected officials who may be more or less in accord with the preferences and attitudes 
of the constituents who elected their representatives. At the same time, legislators may 
behave in such a way as to reflect the preferences and opinions of constituents, or they 
may choose to discount or ignore such preferences. Throughout their careers in 
parliament, members have a number of opportunities to express congruence with 
constituents, but perhaps nowhere more significantly than when voting in the chamber 
on proposed legislation of interest to the electorate in their geographical constituency. 
When choosing how to vote in legislative divisions, members recognise that 
their behaviour may be observed by constituents and may later influence voters’ 
decisions at election time.  When members vote in line with the preferences of 
constituents, they are more likely to hold favour with those constituents, which will 
help maximize their personal vote at a general election. Thus, representatives elected 
under candidate-centred ballot structures may at times vote against their party’s policy 
in parliament to ensure continued electoral support in their districts. A large body of 
research has sought to test empirically these claims of a connection between voter 
preferences and legislators’ actions. One of the earliest studies (Miller and Stokes 1963) 
quantified the degree of control constituents exert on the voting behaviour of members 
                                                 
2 Due to the lack of data on constituency characteristics, Baughman (2004) relies on a 
relatively crude, regional-based, measure of constituency preferences.  
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of the United States House of Representatives, concluding that members of Congress 
deviate from the party line based on local pressure to vote for local interests. As 
discussed above, this approach has enjoyed some success explaining the limited cross-
party voting on free (unmanaged) votes in the House of Commons.  
Yet, in the United Kingdom, where the electorate votes on the basis of a 
candidate’s party label (Denver 2007), the electoral benefits accruing to a dissenting 
legislator have been assumed to be little or none. Pattie, Fieldhouse and Johnston 
(1994) found that the direction of government backbenchers’ votes has little impact on 
their subsequent electoral popularity. Congruence, then, is typically regarded as a 
phenomenon present only in personal-vote electoral environments in which individual 
candidates gain or lose support based on their personal performances. The 
phenomenon is considered of little use for explaining the legislative voting behaviour 
of British MPs. 
Despite this, Kam (2009: 116-141) notes that dissent provides MPs with two 
valuable resources: Increased name recognition and higher approval ratings. In surveys 
of voters, Carman (2006) finds that the British electorate expects their MP to vote on 
the basis of constituency preference even when it conflicts with an MP’s own 
judgement by a margin of 76 to 18 percent. In the same survey, just 10 percent of 
respondents felt that an MP should vote along party lines when the position of the 
party is in conflict with the preference of constituents.  
Spirling (2007) found that when important government business is disrupted 
by an MP’s revolt, that MP is punished at election time. Contrarily, MPs tend to be 
rewarded at election time for rebelling on less important matters. Cowley (2005) found 
that Labour MPs who supported the Governments Iraq War policy and who 
represented constituencies with a significant Muslim population did disproportionately 
worse in the 2005 election than their Labour colleagues who dissented from 
Government policy (see also Cowley and Stuart 2005). This result provides some 
evidence of an electoral effect for voting behaviour in the British case, despite the near-
consensus that the behaviour of individual MPs has little impact on their electoral 
fortunes because of the assumed strong-party nature of the British electoral system. 
But congruence theory can help explain legislative behaviour even in a strong 
party system such as that of the United Kingdom (Gaines and Garrett 1993). Key to 
this argument is recognising that in a party-centred electoral environment, an MP may, 
under certain circumstances, have an electoral incentive to vote against the party 
leadership, as discussed next. 
An MP’s electoral fortune in the next general election is, by conventional 
accounts, tied directly to the electoral fortunes of the MP’s party. Hence, an MP has a 
vested interest in the electoral standing of the party. More precisely, an MP is 
concerned about the electoral popularity of the MP’s party in the MP’s constituency. 
Building on the median-voter theory (Downs 1957), the assumption is that a political 
party’s standing within any constituency directly relates to the policy of each party and 
the congruence between the preferences of the median local voter and the political 
party. If a political party is to win in a given constituency, it must have policies closely 
congruent to the preferences of that electoral segment. This situation, in a single-
constituency, strong party environment, is analogous to the need of legislators in a 
candidate-centred electoral environment to maintain policy congruence with their 
constituents. In a candidate-centred environment, such as the United States, a legislator 
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will vote to maximize the chances of re-election. In a party-centred environment, a 
legislator votes to ensure party policy is as congruent as possible with the preferences 
of constituents. By doing so, legislators attempt to effect party policy to ensure 
continued electoral support for the party within their constituencies. The difference of 
course, is that in the US, an incumbent wins re-election by cultivating personal support, 
in the UK, an incumbent wins re-election not by cultivating personal support but by 
ensuring support for his or her party, or at the very least highlighting a tension between 
the representative’s views and party policy.  
This perspective provides for a very different understanding of legislators’ 
rebellions in party-centred electoral systems than normal accounts provide. While 
existing studies discount constituency-legislator congruence because of the absence of 
personal vote incentives, the perspective presented here exposes the strategic interest 
that MPs have in party-constituency congruence.  
For dissent to occur, the preferences of the legislator and her constituents 
must be at odds with the policy proposal of the legislator’s party. Only under this 
condition is a legislator’s dissent to be expected. Why, then, would the party’s 
leadership make policy proposals that would have electoral costs? Perhaps a trade-off 
occurs because of the heterogeneity of policy preferences across geographical 
constituencies. A party in government will propose a policy that appeals to the median 
national voter, and an individual MP will prefer a policy that appeals to the median 
voter in their constituency. Where a gap exists between the constituency’s preferences 
and the proposed government policy (determined by the preferences of the national 
median voter) the expectation is than an MP will dissent in the legislative vote either in 
an attempt to bring government policy into accord with his or her constituents’ 
preferences or to signal to constituents that he or she is personally at odds with party 
policy. 
 
Empirical Analysis 
Research on domestic anti-terrorism votes in the United States Congress found that 
both Democrat and Republican members were positively responsive in their roll-call 
behaviour to the presence of Muslim voters in their districts (Martin 2009). To test for 
such constituency-legislator congruence in British politics, the empirical focus here is 
on a series of legislative votes in the House of Commons on proposed domestic anti-
terrorism legislation. 
The passage of the Prevention of Terrorism Bill (hereafter, the Terrorism Bill) 
through the House of Commons in 2005 and 2006 included a number of parliamentary 
votes in which a relatively large group of Labour backbenchers revolted against their 
party’s leadership, and, on two occasions, resulted in defeat for the government’s 
policy. Opposition to the legislation came from the British Muslim community who felt 
that the proposed legislation unjustly targeted them. Hence, members of the House of 
Commons faced a policy proposal that was perceived to be targeting specific groups in 
British society.  
Islam is the second most common faith in Britain with just under 3 percent of 
census respondents self-identifying themselves as Muslim (Office for National 
Statistics, nd). Table 1 reports the percentage of Muslims per constituency in England 
and Wales. Just fewer than 60 percent of electoral constituencies in England and Wales 
have a Muslim population of less than 1 percent (331 out of 569 constituencies). 
 6 
Approximately 7 per cent of constituencies have Muslim populations greater than 10 
percent (39 out of 569 constituencies). While no constituency in England or Wales has 
a majority Muslim population, one constituency (Birmingham, Sparkbrook and Small 
Heath) is 48.8 percent Muslim. The picture that emerges is of a geographical 
concentration and a significant inter-constituency variation in the proportion of Muslim 
voters. This variation allows for the possibility of finding a relationship between MPs’ 
voting records and constituents’ religious characteristics.  
[Table 1 around here] 
Evidence exists to suggest that the British Muslim population feels strongly 
that much of the anti-terrorism legislation was targeted toward their community. As 
one human rights watch-group reported: “Muslims in particular have felt targeted and 
under general suspicion, perceptions reinforced by government announcements and 
policies” (Amnesty International, 2005). The British Islamic Human Rights 
Commission, for example, strongly criticized many of the provisions of the Terrorism 
Bill, arguing that it disproportionately targeted Muslims. The Terrorism Bill provides a 
good example of proposed legislation for which certain segments of the population 
have strong preferences that are possibly at odds with the preferences of the general 
population. Because Muslim and minority communities tend to be geographically 
concentrated in particular electoral constituencies, these votes provide an ideal 
opportunity to test for a constituency basis for MPs’ rebellion against the party’s 
leadership. For an MP representing a constituency with a relatively large proportion of 
Muslims, that legislator will know that Muslim constituents will hold the party in 
government electorally accountable for the content of the Terrorism Act, providing an 
incentive for that government MP to vote against the party leadership. 
The roll-call analysis is limited to the votes of members of the government’s 
party. The real interest lies in explaining the voting behaviour of Labour MPs faced 
with either voting with their party or taking an independent position.3 Opposition MPs 
enjoyed a high degree of voting cohesion for the votes being explored here. Voting by 
the opposition parties was in favour of minorities and this lack of variation provides 
further reasons for focusing only on Labour MPs. Religious data limitations require 
including only Labour MPs from England and Wales.  
A summary of the content, proposals and results of each of five different 
division explored in this paper appears in Table 2. The rationales for including these 
votes are twofold: First, in each of these divisions, 15 or more Labour backbenchers 
voted against their party’s leadership. Second, the selected divisions represent the votes 
most reported in the national media, both before and after the vote. The result of each 
vote was a lower than normal government majority, and, on two occasions, an actual 
government defeat. The votes include both Opposition and Government proposals. 
For this reason, each vote by each Labour MP is coded as favouring or opposing the 
                                                 
3 As Spirling (2007: 6) noted, “[A]s with other scholars in the field, our work here will 
concentrate on the behaviour of government (i.e. Labour) party MPs: the ‘power’ of the 
government relative to other parties in a Westminster system means that these 
representatives receive more media attention, and are more likely to be held 
accountable for the state of the polity at election time. Thus, these are the members for 
whom the stakes are highest—for whom party unity and/or independence matter 
most.” 
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preferences of minority electors. Thus, a pro-minority stance is the one which Muslim 
voters would be most likely to support.  
[Table 2 around here] 
While abstentions could be an intermediate form of dissent in the sense that 
an abstaining MP is voting neither for nor against the government, refraining from 
voting could also represent a member who was unable to be in the chamber to vote and 
who may have had a pairing arrangement by agreement with the party whip. Even in the 
presence of a three-line whip, the indefiniteness of the motivation for abstentions 
requires their exclusion from analytical consideration. 
Because the dependent variable is dichotomous, a Logit regression model is 
employed to estimate the constituency effects on votes. This estimation technique is 
frequently used in roll-call vote analyses and is theoretically appropriate here. Each of 
the five votes is estimated separately, rather than being pooled - as is increasingly the 
standard practice in roll-call analyses. Pooling votes violates the independence 
assumption, and legislators’ positions are likely similar across related votes. Because I 
expect the explanatory variable to have similar effects on each of the five votes, each 
vote is analysed separately in order to maintain the independence condition.  
The independent variables are the characteristics of the given constituency. 
Data on constituency characteristics comes from the 2001 Census of Population, unless 
otherwise noted. Of most interest is the proportion of the population in each 
constituency that is Muslim, given that the Muslim community felt themselves to be the 
particular target of much of the proposed legislation. The variable, Muslim, is the 
percentage of the population in a constituency that are Muslim. I include the effect of 
two other measures of inter-constituency diversity of preferences: the percentage 
migrants (Migrant) and the percentage non-white (Ethnic). Perhaps both these 
communities share similar preferences with the Muslim community on policing matters 
and fear being targeted because of race or nationality, or have historically been the 
target of minority profiling. Both these measures positively correlate with Muslim, as 
demonstrated in Table 3. However, one might reasonably expect the effect of Muslim to 
be different and strongest.  Given this circumstance, I the estimates of the effect of 
each of these three measures occur separately. 
[Table 3 around here] 
Controls for a number of other factors that could explain a Labour MP’s 
decision to defect from the leadership position are included. The data for control 
variables comes from The British Parliamentary Constituency Database, 1992-2005.4 The 
variable MP Race captures whether or not the voting MP belongs to an ethnic minority, 
with white MPs coded 0 and ethnic-minority MP coded 1. The expectation is for a 
positive relationship; an ethnic minority Labour MP is more likely than a white MP to 
vote according to pro-minority interest, all else being equal. This variable helps capture 
the personal preferences of the MP which may serve as an alternative explanation of MP 
voting behaviour to the constituency congruence theory. 
I include the variable Candidate race to captures whether or not the sitting MP 
faced a minority candidate in the 2005 election. Evidence from the United States 
indicates that electoral campaigning and the preferences and policies of non-successful 
                                                 
4
 The British Parliamentary Constituency Database, 1992-2005, Release 1.1 compiled by 
Pippa Norris. 
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candidates can often influence the subsequent attitude and voting behaviour of the 
successful candidate (Sulkin, 2005). Included also is the variable Electoral Majority which 
reflects the electoral security of the MP at the 2005 election. MPs in marginal seats are 
more likely to want their party’s label to be in congruence with constituent preferences, 
and thus, are more willing to defect from the party’s leadership. The variable, Freshman, 
measures whether or not the MP was first elected or returned as an incumbent in the 
2005 election. Given their lack of parliamentary experience, newer MPs may be more 
reluctant to stray from the party leadership, regardless of constituents’ preferences.  
 
Results 
The results of the relationship between the percentage of Muslim and Labour MPs 
voting on terrorism legislation are reported in Table Four. As expected, Labour Party 
MPs voting on anti-terrorist legislation is strongly related to the proportion of their 
constituency population that is Muslim. Members are more likely to support the pro-
minority position on anti-terrorist legislation, as the proportion of Muslims increases in 
their constituencies. This holds for all five votes. No other explanatory variable is a 
robust predictor of Labour MPs’ legislative voting on the selected divisions.  
[Table 4 around here] 
Table Five estimates the effect of Migrant. Labour Party members’ voting on 
anti-terrorist legislation is strongly related to the proportion of their constituents who 
are migrants. Members are more likely to support the pro-minority position on anti-
terrorist legislation, as the proportion of migrants increases in their constituencies. This 
holds for all five votes analyzed. A similar pattern is observed in Table 6 which reports 
the effect of Ethnic. Again, Ethnic is a robust predictor of Labour members’ votes on 
anti-terrorist legislation. Members are more likely to support the pro-minority position 
on anti-terrorist legislation, as the proportion of constituents who are ethnic increases. 
[Tables 5 and 6 about here] 
Because the reported coefficients in Tables 4, 5 and 6 are generated using the 
natural log of the odds ratio, difficulty arises in directly interpreting the substantive 
effects of constituency characteristics. Table 7 provides a more intuitive interpretation 
of the Logit results, reporting the estimated substantive effect of the key variables of 
interest: Muslim, Migrant, and Ethnic.  Using simulations performed with CLARIFY 
software, I simulate the predicted probability of observing a pro-minority vote (Tomz, 
Wittenberg and King 2001; King, Tomz and Wittenberg 2000). I then examined how 
the probabilities change as the key variables increase by one standard deviation above 
their means, holding all other explanatory variables constant.  
The effects of constituency diversity are substantively large and highly 
significant. Increasing Migrant by one standard deviation (from 6 percent to 8 percent) 
increases the probability that a Labour Party member will support the minority 
preference by 5.7 points, on average. Migrant has the largest effect on Vote 85 and the 
smallest effect on Vote 186. Increasing Muslim by one standard deviation (from 4 
percent to 10 percent) increases the probability that a Labour Party member will deviate 
from the leadership position towards the preferred minority position by 6.2 points, on 
average. Muslim has the largest effect on Vote 85 (9.5 points) and the smallest effect on 
Vote168 (3 points). Increasing Ethnic by one standard deviation (from 11 percent to 25 
percent) increases the probability that a Labour Party member will deviate from the 
party position towards the minority preference by five points, on average (2.6 points on 
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Vote 168; 3.8 points on Vote 74,). Ethnic had the largest effect on Vote 85 (7.6 points) 
and smallest effect on Vote168 (2.6 points). Of the three measures of district diversity, 
Muslim has the largest average substantive effect on the probability that a Labour Party 
member will vote against anti-terror proposals perceived to target minorities. 
[Table 7 around here] 
Overall, these results provide evidence of a link between constituency 
characteristics and how Labour MPs voted on proposed anti-terrorism legislation. 
Given this, the data provides support for the expected congruence between 
constituents and parliamentarians even in Britain’s party-centred electoral and 
legislative environments.  
 
Conclusion 
An MP’s party affiliation is typically a strong predictor of voting intentions in legislative 
divisions in the British House of Commons. Existing accounts of MPs’ voting 
behaviour has tended to explain party voting by reference to the party-centred nature 
of the electoral system, intra-party ideological cohesion, and the ability of the party 
leadership and local party organisation to reward loyalty and sanction disloyalty. Absent 
from much of the roll-call literature on parliamentary politics in the United Kingdom is 
the idea that constituency characteristics beyond the local party organisation may cause 
an MP to vote against the proposals of the party leadership.  
This paper argued that, under certain circumstances, government MPs would 
dissent from proposed government policy for the electoral purpose of maintaining 
congruence with their constituents even in a strong-party electoral environment. This 
perspective differs from the existing literature linking electoral systems and legislators’ 
behaviour which tends to associate party disunity with candidate-centred electoral rules 
and party unity with strong-party electoral environments (Depauw and Martin 2009). 
The core of the argument tested here is that in a party-centred environment, 
legislators have a personal, strategic, and electoral interest in securing the electoral 
popularity of their party’s label within the constituency. This will cause a government 
MP to act either in an attempt to bring party policy into congruence with the 
preferences of constituents or to disassociate themselves from party policy– even if this 
means voting against proposed government policy. In a strong party environment, 
where cultivating personal votes provides an incumbent with few electoral rewards, 
establishing congruence with constituents aims to ensure national party-local 
constituency congruence. Given the electoral significance of party-constituency 
congruence in a strong party environment, rational government MPs should dissent 
from proposed policies of the government that would be electorally disadvantageous to 
the party label in their constituency, even where proposed government policy is 
electorally advantage at the national level. 
The results of the roll-call analysis of votes on anti-terrorism measures during 
the 2005 and 2006 legislative terms suggest that classical congruence theory of 
legislative representation helps explain patterns of defections even in the presence of 
strong parties. The more Muslims, ethnic minorities and migrants in a Labour MP’s 
district, the more likely that the MP’s vote would be at odds with the party’s leadership 
on the Terrorism Bill and in favour of the position preferred by minority constituents.  
While this finding alone should be of substantive interest to scholars of British 
politics, the results have broader significance for our understanding of congruence and 
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representation in strong party environments. While the conventional wisdom is that 
legislators are responsive to constituents when elected under personal vote electoral 
rules, this evidence suggests that individual legislators must be responsive to their 
constituents even under a party-centred electoral system. Indeed, whether or not the 
electorate votes on the basis of individual candidates’ personal characteristics or on the 
basis of party label, an incumbent may have a functionally equivalent incentive to behave 
as if cultivating personal votes.  This is particularly true in single member districts 
where the electoral fortunes of the candidate directly relate to the electoral popularity 
of their political party. Even under a strong party system, geographically concentrated 
minorities can still have their preferences represented by their local MP, even where 
party policy incongruence with local preferences in minority constituencies. In future 
research I plan to test the validity and broader application of this argument in other 
party-centred electoral systems with different ballot structures.   
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Table 1: Percentage Muslim Per Constituency in England and Wales 
 
Range (% Muslim) No. of constituencies 
<1% 331 
1-2% 66 
2-5% 71 
5-7% 30 
7-10% 32 
10-20% 30 
20-30% 6 
30-40% 2 
40-50 1 
>50 0 
Source: Calculated from Census 2001. 
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Table 2: Summary of Votes Included in This Study 
 
 
Division Vote 74 Vote 75 Vote 84 Vote 85 Vote 168 
 
Date 
 
2 November  2005 
 
2 November  2005 
 
9 November 2005 
 
9 November 2005 
 
15 February 2006 
 
Summary 
 
Proposal that evidence of 
intent must be shown for 
encouragement of 
terrorism to be an 
offence.  
 
Proposal to remove  
glorification of terrorism 
as an offence from the 
bill. 
 
 
Proposal to reaffirm the 
extension of detention 
without charge for 
terrorist suspects to 90 
days. 
 
Proposal to change the 
period of detention without 
charge for terrorist suspects 
to 28 days. 
 
Proposal to affirm 
glorification of terrorism as 
an offence, even where the 
action has no effect and is 
not intended to have an 
effect on anyone's physical 
activity. 
 
Leadership  
support 
 
 
 
Supported by the 
Opposition, opposed by 
the Government.  
 
Supported by the 
Opposition, opposed by 
the Government.  
 
Supported by the 
Government, opposed by 
the Opposition. 
 
Supported by the 
Opposition, opposed by the 
Government 
 
Supported by the 
Government, opposed by 
the Opposition. 
 
Outcome 
 
 
Government majority of 
1 (amendment rejected). 
 
Government majority of 
5 (amendment rejected). 
 
Government defeat of 31 
(amendment rejected).  
 
Government defeat of 33 
(amendment carried). 
 
Government majority of 
38 (amendment carried). 
 
Labour Party  
Unity 
 
With Party = 301 
Against Party = 34 
Absent = 19 
 
With Party = 306 
Against Party = 27 
Absent = 21 
 
With Party = 291 
Against Party = 49 
Absent = 14 
 
With Party = 289 
Against Party = 51 
Absent = 14 
 
With Party = 316 
Against Party = 17 
Absent = 20 
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Table 3: Pairwise Correlations for Key Constituency Characteristics 
  
 
 Ethnic Migrant Muslim 
Ethnic  1.00 - - 
Migrant  0.44 1.00 - 
Muslim  0.84 0.30 1.00 
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Table 4: Logit Analysis of Labour Members’ Votes  
 
 1 2 3 4 5 
 Vote74 Vote75 Vote84 Vote85 Vote168 
Muslim 0.088 0.095 0.106 0.117 0.082 
 
(0.030)**
* 
(0.032)**
* 
(0.029)**
* 
(0.030)**
* (0.037)** 
MP Race -1.778 -1.609 -0.816 -0.485 -1.247 
 (1.754) (1.905) (1.072) (0.876) (1.868) 
Candidate Race 0.087 0.077 -0.268 -0.169 0.154 
 (0.472) (0.539) (0.472) (0.465) (0.646) 
Electoral Majority  0.014 0.012 0.005 -0.004 0.018 
 (0.013) (0.016) (0.013) (0.012) (0.018) 
Freshman -1.642 -1.335 -0.431 -0.551  
 (1.056) (1.068) (0.593) (0.59)  
Constant -2.55 -2.862 -2.126 -1.971 -3.357 
 
(0.407)**
* 
(0.441)**
* 
(0.344)**
* 
(0.328)**
* 
(0.522)**
* 
Observations 278 278 282 285 246 
Pseudo R2 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.08 0.05 
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
DV is coded so that 1 is a pro-minority vote.  
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Table 5: Logit Analysis of Labour Members’ Votes  
 
 1 2 3 4 5 
 Vote74 Vote75 Vote84 Vote85 Vote168 
Migrant 0.164 0.239 0.188 0.201 0.233 
 
(0.063)**
* 
(0.069)**
* 
(0.053)**
* 
(0.052)**
* 
(0.078)**
* 
MP Race -0.617 -0.34 0.29 0.329 0.212 
 (1.073) (1.115) (0.701) (0.702) (1.117) 
Candidate Race 0.244 0.155 0.083 0.184 0.182 
 (0.448) (0.533) (0.422) (0.408) (0.608) 
Electoral Majority 0.019 0.021 0.008 0.002 0.025 
 (0.014) (0.018) (0.013) (0.013) (0.022) 
Freshman -1.624 -1.367 -0.484 -0.572  
 (1.077) (1.139) (0.561) (0.564)  
Constant -3.349 -4.267 -3.032 -2.949 -4.78 
 
(0.636)**
* 
(0.755)**
* 
(0.538)**
* 
(0.514)**
* 
(0.934)**
* 
Observations 278 278 282 285 246 
Pseudo R2 0.09 0.07 0.06 0.1 0.07 
  
Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
DV is coded so that 1 is a pro-minority vote.  
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Table 6: Logit Analysis of Labour Members’ Votes 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 
 Vote74 Vote75 Vote84 Vote85 Vote168 
Ethnic 0.028 0.039 0.034 0.039 0.034 
 (0.012)** 
(0.013)**
* 
(0.011)**
* 
(0.011)**
* (0.014)** 
MP Race -1.262 -1.241 -0.42 -0.481 -0.741 
 (1.173) (1.216) (0.802) (0.824) (1.221) 
Candidate Race 0.202 0.114 -0.077 0.001 0.173 
 (0.462) (0.524) (0.448) (0.43) (0.604) 
Electoral Majority 0.011 0.008 -0.001 -0.009 0.013 
 (0.013) (0.016) (0.013) (0.013) (0.019) 
Freshman -1.65 -1.394 -0.451 -0.561  
 (1.068) (1.113) (0.586) (0.595)  
Constant -2.451 -2.851 -1.999 -1.875 -3.357 
 
(0.399)**
* 
(0.446)**
* 
(0.329)**
* 
(0.317)**
* 
(0.539)**
* 
Observations 278 278 282 285 246 
Pseudo R2 0.05 0.07 0.04 0.06 0.05 
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
DV is coded so that 1 is a pro-minority vote.  
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Table 7: Substantive Effects of Constituency Characteristics 
 
 Ethnic Migrant Muslim 
Vote 74 0.038** 0.047*** 0.052** 
Vote 75 0.044*** 0.055*** 0.046*** 
Vote 84 0.063*** 0.07*** 0.086*** 
Vote 85 0.076*** 0.079*** 0.095*** 
Vote 168 0.026** 0.035*** 0.03** 
 
Note: Values represent the change in the predicted probability of voting for 
minority-favoured views as each variable of interest is increased by one standard 
deviation over its mean, holding other variables constant (MP Race is set to 0; 
Candidate Race is set to 0; Electoral Majority is set to its median value). Freshman is 
excluded from all estimated models in order to ensure comparability with Vote 
168 for which Freshman is dropped because it predicts the outcome variable.  
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table 8: Descriptive Statistics 
 
Variable Observations Mean Std. 
Deviation 
Min. Max. 
Ethnic 569 8.31 11.98 0.48 66.27 
Migrant 569 6.23 2.73 1.46 19.17 
Muslim 569 2.82 5.27 .05 48.81 
Candidate 
Race 
569 0.14 0.35 0 1 
Electoral 
Majority 
569 18.91 12.31 .1 63.8 
Freshman 569 0.18 0.39 0 1 
 
 
 
